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INTRODUCTION
Overcriminalization is often viewed as an issue about whether
conduct should be punished criminally or whether it should be left to
a civil adjudication of rights and remedies, including a governmental
civil enforcement suit. The label "criminal" is a special one that
connotes society's condemnation of certain conduct as deserving
punishment, but it is also the community's moral judgment that
certain conduct is wrongful. Professor Sanford H. Kadish asserted
almost forty years ago "that the criminal law is a highly specialized
tool of social control.., that when improperly used it is capable of
producing more evil than good."' When the legislature defines ever-
wider forms of conduct as crimes, the effectiveness of criminal law as
both a deterrent and a means of affixing moral blameworthiness may
be substantially diminished. As such, overuse of the criminal law risks
its utility to society.
2
©0 2005 PeterJ. Henning.
Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School I appreciate the
comments and suggestions provided by the Wayne State University Law School faculty at
a presentation on the topic, and to Professor Ellen S. Podgor.
1. Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 157, 169 (1967).
2. See Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 703, 713
(2005) (Overcriminalization "encompasses a broad array of issues, including: what
should be denominated a crime and when it should be enforced; who falls within the
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The primary focus of those who condemn overcriminalization is on
the legislature's role in expanding the types of conduct that will be
labeled criminal.3  However, the role of the prosecutor in applying
the law is also relevant to the overcriminalization debate. Regardless
of the scope of the laws enacted by legislatures, the prosecutor
decides what charges to file, and whether the law should be applied
in a mundane or novel manner. Professor William J. Stuntz argues
that "the story of American criminal law is a story of tacit cooperation
between prosecutors and legislators, each of whom benefits from
more and broader crimes, and growing marginalization of judges,
who alone are likely to opt for narrower liability rules rather than
broader ones."5 This is especially true at the federal level, where the
law's strictures or, conversely, avoids liability altogether; and what should be the
boundaries of punishment and the proper sentence in specific cases."); see alsoJohn
C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 193 (1991) (arguing that
criminalizing negligent and intentional behavior blurs the distinction between tort
and crime and, as a result, weakens the criminal law as a means of social control).
3. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Ir., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 1958, at 401, 417 (stating critically, "The statute books of the forty-
nine states and the United States are filled with enactments carrying a criminal
sanction which are obviously motivated by other ends, primarily, than that of training
responsible citizenship."). See generally Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use
of Criminal Sanctions to Enforce Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1963)
(outlining the problems inherent in a criminal justice approach to economic
regulation).
4. See Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress:
Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533,
1545-46 (1997) ("There are two senses in which criminal sanctions might be said to
be 'overused.' One is that such sanctions are over-authorized by Congress and the
state legislatures. The other is that, where authorized, they are over-applied by
prosecutors and courts.").
5. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 510 (2001). A parallel development exists involving the federalization of the
criminal law. Certainly, the Supreme Court has, in some instances, criticized the
extension of federal jurisdiction over common street crimes. See United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995), which struck down the Gun Free School Zones
Act of 1990 as an improper use of Congress's Commerce Clause authority, and United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000), which struck down 42 U.S.C. § 13981
(1994), a part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, because it exceeded
Congress's Commerce Clause authority.
However, there is a trend toward adding to the number of federal laws that can be
used to punish conduct already subject to state prosecution. The effect of this
coordination of prosecutions enhances the penalties that can be imposed. For
example, this past year, Congress adopted a law making it a federal crime to murder
a fetus, largely in response to the murder of Laci Peterson and her unborn child. See
Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004 (Laci and Connor's Law), Pub. L. No. 108-
212, 118 Stat. 568 (2004) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2004)). This is already a
crime in most states. See Alan S. Wasserstrom, Homicide Based on Killing Unborn Child,
64 A.L.R. 671, 689-740 (5th ed. 2004) (detailing how various states prosecute the
killing of unborn children). Similarly, a Department of Justice initiative called
"Project Safe Neighborhoods" moves individuals charged with crimes in state court
into the federal system when they have prior arrests and possessed a weapon at the
time of their offense, which under federal sentencing laws triggers a significantly
670 [Vol. 54:669
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Department of Justice ("DOJ") has been quite effective in getting
Congress to approve legislation enacting broader crimes and-at
least until recently-in shifting much of the power to set sentences to
federal prosecutors.6
The recent spate of misconduct in large, publicly traded
corporations has led to what can be viewed as a new form of
overcriminalization-the targeting of legal advice as an obstacle in
pursuing the investigation of corporate wrongdoing. This form of
overcriminalization does not involve the adoption of new laws or an
attempt to have courts adopt a new interpretation of an older statute
to address changed circumstances. It is hardly the case that federal
prosecutors need new criminal statutes to prosecute misconduct by
corporations and their managers, as they already have mail/wire
fraud,7 securities fraud,8 obstruction of justice,9 and false statement °
prohibitions.
The difficulty prosecutors face in prosecuting corporate
misconduct and other types of white collar crimes is identifying the
particular acts that violate the statute, and then amassing sufficient
proof of intent to establish that a crime has occurred. White collar
crime investigations frequently take months, even years, to complete,
and prosecutors must dig through mounds of records to determine
who is responsible for the misconduct." Except for some narrow
regulatory and environmental crimes that are strict liability offenses,
corporate crimes almost always require proof of specific intent.2 It is
increased sentence. See Project Safe Neighborhoods, Project Safe Neighborhood Initiative
Launched On Long Island-Sixteen Prior Felony Offenders Face Federal Firearms Charges
(July 2, 2002), at http://www.psn.gov/Safer.asp?section=123 (on file with the
American University Law Review). The federalization of law enforcement can be
used as a tool to impose ever-increasing sentences on those who would normally be
subject to prosecution only in a state court. Id.
6. See Stuntz, supra note 5, at 545 (observing Congress's willingness to give in to
the demands of federal prosecutors even if their demands are inconsistent with the
goals of the public).
7. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2004).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1348.
9. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1518.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
11. For example, indictments of senior officers of Enron did not occur until over
two years after the company's bankruptcy, and the first criminal trial involving an
Enron transaction only began in September 2004.
12. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435, 441-43
(1978) (refusing to hold that the Sherman Act imposes strict liability on corporations
or corporate officials for anti-competitive behavior, in part because strict liability in
the context of corporate crime could deter businesses from engaging in "salutary and
procompetitive conduct lying close to the borderline of impermissible conduct" for
fear of punishing good-faith mistakes ofjudgment). Noting that actors subjected to
strict liability will exercise extraordinary care in their undertakings, the Court
distinguished the antitrust context, in which over-regulation will discourage
20051
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rare when prosecutors do not have to use circumstantial evidence to
argue that the defendant(s) -both individual and organizational-
had the requisite knowledge or purpose.
When a corporation's officers are the targets of the investigation,
counsel will usually represent them, often paid by the corporation.
The presence of lawyers-frequently from large law firms with fairly
sophisticated white collar crime practice groups that are stocked full
of former federal prosecutors-makes the investigatory process much
more complicated because skilled counsel know how to protect
clients in these types of investigations and how to bargain for reduced
charges and sentences.
13
In 2003, the then-Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson
issued a memorandum with the tide "Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations" (the "Thompson
Memorandum"), which announced a set of principles to guide
federal prosecutors in deciding whether to charge a corporation with
a crime.1 4 Among the principles federal prosecutors should consider
are "the corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing
legitimate business activity to the public's detriment, from laws regulating food, in
which "excessive" caution by producers will promote the public good. Id. at 441
n.17.
13. See Stuart P. Green, Moral Ambiguity in White Collar Criminal Law, 18 NOTRE
DAMEJ.L. ETHICs & PUB. POL'Y 501, 516-17 (2004) ("Highly paid white collar criminal
defense lawyers are more successful at almost every stage in the criminal justice
process than their public defender counterparts. They do a betterjob of persuading
prosecutors not to indict, preventing the prosecution from obtaining evidence
needed to convict, keeping witnesses from talking to prosecutors, presenting their
case in the media, obtaining favorable plea bargains, pursuing post-conviction
appeals, and arguing mitigation in sentencing.").
14. Memorandum from Larry Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to Heads of Department Components and United States Attomeys (]an.
20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/dag/cftf/corporateguidelines.htm. Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder,
Thomson's predecessor, issued a similar memorandum in 1999. See Memorandum
from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to All Heads
of Department Components and United States Attorneys (June 16,1999) (discussing
the bringing of criminal charges against corporations), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov:80/criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.html. The
Thompson Memorandum sought to explain in greater detail the DOJ's position on
the issue of charging corporations:
The main focus of the revisions is increased emphasis on and scrutiny of the
authenticity of a corporation's cooperation. Too often business
organizations, while purporting to cooperate with a Department
investigation, in fact take steps to impede the quick and effective exposure of
the complete scope of wrongdoing under investigation. The revisions make
clear that such conduct should weigh in favor of a corporate prosecution.
The revisions also address the efficacy of the corporate governance
mechanisms in place within a corporation, to ensure that these measures are
truly effective rather than mere paper programs.
Thompson Memorandum, supra, at Introduction.
[Vol. 54:669
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and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents,
including, if necessary, the waiver of corporate attorney-client and
work product protection. '' While most commentary about the
Thompson Memorandum focused on the waiver issue, there is
another aspect that discloses an even more disturbing view regarding
legal advice. In assessing cooperation, the Thompson Memorandum
states that the prosecutor should consider "whether the corporation
appears to be protecting its culpable employees and agents" and can
consider "the advancing of attorneys [sic] fees" and sharing
information pursuant to ajoint defense agreement.16
The payment of attorney's fees by a corporation is not a failure of
cooperation unless one views the presence of a lawyer for a corporate
officer as an impediment to an investigation. A lawyer is unlikely to
recommend that a client, who is the target of an investigation,
cooperate with the government, or at least, not without the
protection of an immunity agreement or plea bargain. This does not
mean the lawyer's advice is wrongful or designed to obstruct justice.
Similarly, a joint defense agreement17 facilitates the pooling of
information and representational tasks among lawyers representing
different parties who share a common interest. Courts recognize the
propriety ofjoint defense agreements as an extension of the attorney-
client privilege, 8 and therefore, any discussions pursuant to these
agreements will not be available to the government without a waiver
by every participant in the agreement. 19 Although the privilege
makes it more difficult to gather information, one of the foundations
of our legal system is that the government cannot compel disclosure
of privileged communications absent proof that they were made to
further a crime or fraud. °
15. Id. at II.
16. Id. atVI.B.
17. See The Corporate Counsel Section of the New York State Bar Association,
Legal Development: Report on Cost-Effective Management of Corporate Litigation, 59 ALB. L.
REV. 263, 310 (defining a joint defense agreement as a written agreement between
multiple defendants who have, at a minimum, a willingness to cooperate on the case
by sharing litigation costs and by preserving confidential information and may
include an agreement to delegate particular responsibilities to certain defendants).
18. See, e.g., infra note 142.
19. See Lawrence D. Finder, Internal Investigations: Consequences of the Federal
Deputation of Corporate America, 45 S. TEX. L. REv. 111, 113 (2003) (citing United States
v. Almeida, 341 F.3d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir. 2003), for the proposition that even
though federal prosecutors dislike the use of joint defense agreements, it is highly
unusual for the government to threaten prosecution for merely participating in a
joint defense agreement).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562-63 (1989) (noting the
existence of a crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege).
20051 673
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Defense lawyers representing individual officers certainly can make
it more difficult for the government to investigate corporate
misconduct. However, that alone is hardly a jdstification for viewing
the payment of attorney's fees or a joint defense agreement-both of
which are completely legal and reasonable decisions by the lawyer-
. • • 21
as a sign that a corporation is not cooperating with an investigation.
The drive to prosecute corporate misconduct, which frequently
involves questionable but not obviously criminal conduct, has led the
DOJ to adopt a position that views its ability to prosecute corporate
crime as being hamstrung by the presence of lawyers. More than a
nuisance, the DOJ views lawyers as a roadblock to criminal
prosecution that, apparently, now requires the government to take a
more aggressive approach to limit, if not eliminate, the protections
afforded to the targets of an investigation.
This new tack is symptomatic of the DOJ's broader push against
lawyers. I do not assert that there is a "war on defense lawyers" that is
"part of a hitherto undisclosed plan to drive lawyers away from
representing corporate officers.2 3 There is, however, a trend towards
using the criminal law and the government's investigatory tools
against lawyers because of what appears to be a deep-seated suspicion
of legal advice as something harmful or inappropriate. Lawyers
commit crimes, and there is no claim that they should be exempt
21. SeeJohn Hasnas, Ethics and the Problem of White Collar Crime, 54 Am. U. L. Rev.
579, 584 (2005) (noting that business people "have contractual, as well as informal
customary obligations to their employees, customers, and suppliers. Further, they
have their ordinary ethical obligations as human beings to honor their commitments
and to deal honestly with others. These obligations can, and to an increasing extent
do, conflict with the obligation to take the most effective steps to comply with federal
law. When the law provides incentives to violate one's ethical duties to others,
business people face a difficult choice. Federal prosecutors do not. Business people
must decide the extent to which they can ethically expose their firm to the risk of
legal liability in order to meet their other obligations. Federal prosecutors, whose
only obligation is to the law, need only judge the level of the firm's legal compliance.
Simply expressed, business people's ethical dilemmas are not federal prosecutors'
problem.").
22. See generally Thompson Memorandum, supra note 14 (providing guidance for
lawyers working with cooperating corporations during a corporate fraud
investigation and noting that corporations may purport to be cooperating with a DOJ
investigation, while simultaneously trying to impede the DOJ's discovery of the scope
of the corporation's wrongdoing).
23. But see Finder, supra note 19, at 113 (contending that because of an increased
emphasis on corporate cooperation and indictment avoidance, companies essentially
become an investigatory arm of the government); David M. Zornow & Keith D.
Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New World: The Death of Privilege in Corporate Criminal
Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 147, 147 (2000) (arguing that the government
prefers turning corporations into arms of law enforcement by emphasizing
cooperation instead of preserving principles at the heart of our adversarial system).
The emphasis on cooperation creates divisive relationships between senior
management and employees because of senior management's rush to cooperate. Id.
674 [Vol. 54:669
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from the application of the criminal law. But, at the same time, the
presence of a lawyer is not a red flag or in any way nefarious.
Prosecutors need to show greater respect for the attorney-client
relationship, including privileged communications. Efforts to
enforce criminal law, which make legal advice a target of prosecution
and an indicator of guilt, are a sure sign of overcriminalization.
Part I of the Article considers why prosecutors mistrust lawyers by
looking at cases involving lawyer misconduct that obstructs justice,
and how even acting ethically means that a lawyer can act to frustrate
a criminal prosecution. While lawyers are viewed with mistrust, cases
involving outright obstruction are rare and do not reflect the true
role of lawyers in representing clients in criminal cases. Part II
assesses recent cases in which federal prosecutors have targeted
lawyers for prosecution, and asks whether the practice of law is
starting to be viewed as potentially criminal. Part III looks at the
government's most recent approach as shown in pronouncements
regarding legal advice as potentially obstructing investigations of
corporate misconduct. In my view, the Department of Justice's
determination that a corporation providing a lawyer to an employee
in connection with a criminal investigation can be considered
obstructive. This approach denigrates legal advice and moves beyond
mere lawyer misconduct to seeking improperly the elimination of
lawyers to further the government's own interests, at a significant cost
to the targets of corporate crime investigations.
I. CAN'T WE TRUST LAWYERS?
The DOJ's approach to legal advice reflects a broader mistrust of
the legal profession. At least as reflected in television police
programs, for which there is no shortage of fictional valorous officers
solving complex crimes, lawyers (sometimes including prosecutors)
are obstacles to be avoided or their legal advice is an unfortunate
nuisance. More importantly, it is assumed that a person-invariably
the guilty suspect-who is advised by a lawyer will never cooperate or
provide valuable information. The job of the lawyer, apparently, is to
make it much 'more difficult for the police to obtain information
24
while shielding the guilty party from justice.
24. The media assumption is incorrect at least in drug cases in which significant
mandatory minimum sentences create a powerful incentive for lawyers to engage in
plea discussions early on in an investigation and provide valuable information to
prosecutors to gain the government's support for a departure from the required
term of imprisonment.
2005] 675
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The phrase "lawyering up" has entered the popular lexicon as
meaning that a person suspected of a crime will listen to the lawyer's
advice and will not cooperate in the investigation, thus thwarting a
successful prosecution. 5 Professors Bandes and Beermann described
how, on the television program NYPD Blue, the prospect of a lawyer
advising an investigatory target had significant ramifications:
The detectives understand that if the guy they like lawyers up, they
won't get a confession. The relentless pursuit of the confession is
driven by the detectives' assessment that they are unlikely to obtain
a conviction without one. In one episode, after Andy Sipowicz
threatens to beat up a suspect in the sexual assault and killing of a
young girl unless he confesses, another detective (not one of the
regulars) criticizes Sipowicz because the technique might have
jeopardized the case by scaring the suspect into lawyering up. It is
not that coerced confessions are wrong, it is that coercion,
improperly employed, may result in a fate worse than death, the
26
appearance of a lawyer.
There is no question that advising a person suspected of a crime to
decline an invitation to cooperate in an investigation, at least by not
speaking with the police before charges are filed, is proper and,
indeed, sound legal advice. It hardly needs to be said that the most
damning evidence in a criminal trial is the statement of the
defendant admitting the misconduct, regardless of any excuses or
explanations that may be offered for the conduct. Counseling a
suspect to remain silent may frustrate the police, but the criminal
justice system imposes upon lawyers the absolute duty to represent
their clients within the bounds of the law.
For white collar and corporate crime investigations, the presence
of lawyers for targets, subjects, and witnesses is commonplace. It is
rare when a case does not involve an extended grand. jury
investigation, subpoenas for large volumes of records, and witness
proffers-all mediated by lawyers for the company and individuals.
Yet, even in these types of investigations, prosecutors lament the
presence of lawyers who slow down the process."
25. SeeAdam Hanft, Neolawisms, LEGALAFFAIRS, Feb. 2003, at 17 (explaining that
NYPD Blue popularized the term "lawyering up" when referring to the difficulty of
interrogating a suspect represented by a lawyer).
26. Susan Bandes &Jack Beermann, Lauyering Up, 2 GREEN BAG 5, 9 (1998).
27. See Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., Wearing a Bull's Eye: Observations on the Differences
Between Prosecuting for a United States Attorney's Office and an Office of Independent
Counsel, 29 STETSON L. REv. 95, 146 (1999) (noting that, in the context of
Independent Counsel investigations of wrongdoing by high level officials, "lawyering
up" increases the duration of investigations due to the presence of lawyers).
Similarly, Professor John Barrett, another former Associate Independent Counsel,
criticized the attorney's fee provision of the now-expired Independent Counsel Act
[Vol. 54:669
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If lawyers only delayed investigations, there would be little reason
to be concerned by the presence of a lawyer except for the increased
cost and energy necessary to complete an investigation. However,
there is more at issue than just dilatory tactics by defense counsel.
The fear must be that lawyers, by their nature, obstruct criminal
investigations. One example of how lawyers are more than just an
impediment is the notorious e-mail sent by an Arthur Andersen
lawyer to the audit partner on the Enron engagement, seeking the
removal of references to the involvement of the firm's in-house
counsel from a memorandum regarding whether Enron's disclosures
had been misleading.28 This single e-mail turned out to be the crucial
piece of evidence showing Arthur Andersen's corrupt intent to
obstruct justice.2 9 The lawyer's complicity was only emphasized when
she asserted her Fifth Amendment right and refused to testify at
trial.30
How far can defense counsel go? In Nix v. Whiteside,3' the Supreme
Court made it clear that a defendant has no right to testify falsely,
and that a defense lawyer who knows that the client will commit
perjury does not violate the Sixth Amendment-or the ethical duties
of the profession-by threatening to disclose that fact to the court,
even though the information is privileged.2  The Court noted that
for inviting individuals to hire lawyers:
It has become a trough that lawyers seek to feed in. And the prospect of this
ultimate reimbursement from the government seems to have encouraged all
kinds of "lawyering up," often orchestrated by White House Counsel. It
prolongs and complicates Independent Counsel investigations when even
the most minor potential witnesses are represented by counsel who look
forward to reimbursement. And this provision obviously increases the public
tab for an Independent Counsel's work.
John Q. Barrett, Independent Counsel Law Improvements for the Next Five Years, 51 ADMIN.
L. REV. 631, 649 (1999).
28. See Green, supra note 13, at 504 ("Among the pieces of evidence that jurors
found most incriminating was an email from in-house Andersen lawyer, Nancy
Temple, instructing Andersen partner, David Duncan, to remove language from an
internal Andersen memo suggesting that Andersen had concluded that an earlier
Enron final disclosure had been misleading. The email also advised Duncan to
remove any reference to consultations with Andersen's in-house legal team, saying it
could be considered a waiver of attorney-client privilege.").
29. See United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 374 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2004),
cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 823 (2005) (noting Temple's reminder that Andersen staff
should be in compliance with the company's document retention policy in the face
of an upcoming government investigation).
30. See Stephan Landsman, Death of an Accountant: The Jury Convicts Arthur
Andersen of Obstruction of Justice, 78 CHI.-KENT L. Rzv. 1203, 1217 (2003) (noting a
heightened sense of suspicion after Temple and others invoked their Fifth
Amendment rights).
31. 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
32. Id. at 173. The Court reasoned that the right to testify, at a minimum, does
not permit a person to testify falsely. Id.
2005]
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"the legal profession has accepted that an [sic) lawyer's ethical duty
to advance the interests of his client is limited by an equally solemn
duty to comply with the law and standards of professional conduct; it
specifically ensures that the client may not use false evidence. 3 3 In
Maness v. Meyers,34 the Court recognized that a lawyer cannot be held
in contempt for advising a client to assert the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination and for refusing to turn over documents
protected by the privilege because of the effect it would have on the
provision of legal services.35 It rationalized, "If performance of a
lawyer's duty to advise a client that a privilege is available exposes a
lawyer to the threat of contempt for giving honest advice, it is hardly
debatable that some advocates may lose their zeal for forthrightness
and independence."6
The zealous defense lawyer can, and perhaps must, make it more
difficult for the government to obtain a conviction, 7 but there is a
limit to the lawyer's ability to secure an acquittal for the client. Can
defense lawyers cross over the line and obstruct justice in their
representation of criminal defendants? The sad truth is that there
are more than a few examples to feed the perception that lawyers for
criminal defendants will actively mislead prosecutors and judges in
seeking an acquittal for their clients. In In re Foley,38 a defense lawyer's
dealings with an undercover agent were captured on tape, including
his persistent recommendation to the "client" about concocting a
defense to a weapons possession charge.39 In suspending the lawyer,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated, "What is unusual
about this case is our ability to perceive with full clarity the depth of
that misconduct and the ready ease with which the respondent
engaged in it. The respondent's own words repeatedly reflect
complete disregard, if not utter contempt, for the fundamental
ethical obligations of an officer of the court. '
One recurrent example of defense lawyer misconduct involving
deception involves substituting a different person for the defendant
at the defense table during trial to have a prosecution witness make
an incorrect identification of the person sitting next to the defense
33. Id. at 168.
34. 419 U.S. 449 (1975).
35. Id. at 470.
36. Id. at 466.
37. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2003) (stating that a lawyer for a
defendant in a criminal case may require the prosecution to prove every element of
the case).
38. 787 N.E.2d 561 (Mass. 2003).
39. Id. at 563-64.
40. Id. at 568.
[Vol. 54:669
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counsel as the perpetrator of the crime.4' Once the misidentification
occurs, the defendant has a powerful argument that the witness'
testimony should not be credited by the jury or court.
In People v. Simac," the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a criminal
contempt conviction of a defense lawyer who had a clerical worker
from his office sit next to him at the defense table while the
defendant sat in the back of the courtroom." He dressed one of
them in a blue striped shirt and the other in a red striped shirt.44 In
arguing that the evidence did not support the contempt charge,
Simac asserted that he did not make any affirmative
misrepresentation to the court regarding the identity of the clerical
worker, as he carefully avoided any reference to him as the defendant
or his client.45  Rejecting that argument, the court stated that "an
attorney must not deceive the court as to the defendant's identity
despite the attorney's obligation to vigorously represent his client.
Such a deception prevents the court from fulfilling its obligation and
derogates from the court's dignity and authority."46 This is not an
isolated example of this tactic, which has been tried over the years
and which, when spotted, results in punishment for the defense
lawyer.47
41. JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAWYER
§ 34:23, at 1178 (2d ed. 1996) (warning that a court may hold a lawyer in contempt
of court for substituting another person, without the court's approval, to cause a
misidentification of the defendant). In In re Gross, 759 N.E.2d 288, 289, 294 (Mass.
2001), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court imposed an eighteen-month
suspension on a lawyer who "concocted a plan" to have an alibi witness, who had a
similar appearance to the defendant, impersonate the defendant at the second call
of the case in the hope that it would induce the victim to misidentify the person who
left the scene of an accident.
42. 641 N.E.2d 416 (Ill. 1994).
43. Id. at 417-18. 0
44. Id. at 418. After the police officer identified the clerical worker as the person
involved in the automobile accident, Simac called the clerical worker to testify to his
true identity. Id.
45. Id. at 419. When the officer identified the clerical worker as the person
involved in the accident, the trial judge stated for the record that the officer had
identified "the defendant." Id. The Illinois Supreme Court found that Simac's
failure to take any action to correct the judge's misunderstanding was a deception.
Id. at 422.
46. Id.
47. See United States v. Sabater, 830 F.2d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1987) (maintaining that
substituting another person for the defendant at the defense table violated the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility); United States v. Thoreen, 653 F.2d 1332, 1343 (9th
Cir. 1981) (upholding a contempt conviction against an attorney who substituted
another person for his client at the counsel table to cause a misidentification);
Miskovsky v. State ex rel. Jones, 586 P.2d 1104, 1109-10 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978)
(ruling that a lower court properly found an attorney in contempt for substituting
another person for his client at the defense table, but finding the $500 fine
excessive). In Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Rohrback, 591 A.2d 488, 498-99 (Md. Ct.
App. 1991), a defense lawyer was suspended for forty-five days for not informing a
20051 679
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The question of whether a lawyer's ,effort to deceive the court
constitutes obstruction of justice, rather than just an ethical violation
or contempt of court, arose in United States v. Kloess.48 Kloess, a
defense lawyer, failed to alert a state court that his client gave a false
name when stopped for a traffic violation and when found to be in
possession of a firearm.49 The client was on probation for a federal
crime and could not possess a weapon, so Kloess' failure to reveal his
client's true identity to the state court avoided having the client jailed
for a federal, probation violation. 5  Kloess was charged with
obstruction of justice 1 by federal prosecutors for his conduct in state
court.5 2  The charge required the government to prove that he
engaged in "misleading conduct" with the intent to "hinder, delay, or
prevent" information from being communicated to a federal judge
about a crime or probation violation. 53
In 18 U.S.C. § 1515(c), Congress provides lawyers with a defense to
an obstruction charge. The statute provides, "This chapter does not
prohibit or punish the providing of lawful, bona fide, legal
representation services in connection with or anticipation of an
official proceeding.' 4 In Kloess, the Eleventh Circuit found that this
provision "provides a complete defense to the statute because one
who is performing bona fide legal representation does not have an
improper purpose. His purpose, to zealously represent his client, is
fully protected by the law."55
Section 1515(c) is consistent with the requirements of the ethics
rules, which recognize that defense lawyers in criminal cases can test
probation officer that his client had given a different name to avoid the discovery of
prior convictions likely to have resulted in the imposition of a term of imprisonment
rather than a suspended sentence. A particularly egregious impersonation case is
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Raiford, 687 A.2d 1118, 1119-20 (Pa. 1997), in which a
lawyer was disbarred when he had someone impersonate one of his clients and plead
guilty to the possession of drugs found in a car owned by another of the lawyer's
clients. The lawyer misled the impersonated client about the status of the charges so
that the client would not learn of the scheme. Id. at 1119. The defense lawyer was
eventually convicted of criminal charges for obstruction ofjustice, and, in upholding
his disbarment, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that for a lawyer "[t]o
engineer a criminal conviction of his own client without her knowledge is so
outrageously unethical as to require no further comment." Id. at 1120.
48. 251 F.3d941 (llth Cir. 2001).
49. Id. at 943.
50. Id.
51. See 18 U.S.C. § 1515 (2002).
52. Kloess, 251 F.3d at 943.
53. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1515(c)).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1515(c).
55. 251 F.3d at 948. The court held that once a defendant fairly raises a defense
under § 1515(c), the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
conduct did not constitute bona fide, lawful legal representation. Id. at 949.
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the strength of the government's cases even when counsel believes
the evidence is sufficient to convict. 6 This duty of zealous advocacy
permits a defense lawyer to seek to undermine the credibility of
government witnesses, regardless of whether their testimony is
truthful, and to advance a defense that the client is not guilty even if
the lawyer knows that the defendant committed the crime.
57
A lawyer's use of the legal system's tools to assist a client can
become the basis for an obstruction of justice charge if the jury finds
that the lawyer crossed the line between legitimate advocacy and a
corrupt purpose. In United States v. Cueto,58 the Seventh Circuit
upheld the conviction of a lawyer for obstruction based in part on his
filing for a restraining order against an undercover informant. The
government advanced a theory that the lawyer sought to protect his
personal financial interests in his client's illegal gambling business.,5
The government argued that the litigation-related conduct, while not
illegal itself, was for the purpose of obstructing the government's
criminal investigation of the client.60 In finding the requisite intent
to act corruptly, the Seventh Circuit stated, "As a lawyer, [defendant]
possessed a heightened awareness of the law and its scope, and he
cannot claim lack of fair notice as to what conduct is proscribed by
§ 1503 to shield himself from criminal liability, particularly when he
was already 'bent on serious wrongdoing."'61 While bona fide legal
services fall outside the scope of the obstruction of justice statute, the
lawyer's knowledge of the law and his client can be used to prove the
corrupt intent necessary to obviate any protection provided to the
lawyer under § 1515(c) 62 The responsibility of the lawyer to know
56. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2002).
57. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 213
(2d ed. 2002) ("Is it ever proper for a lawyer to cross-examine an adverse witness who
has testified accurately and truthfully in order to make the witness appear to be
mistaken or lying? Our answer is yes-but the same answer is also given by almost
every other commentator on lawyers' ethics."); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS 587 (1986) ("Once the lawyer undertakes the defense, he or she may not
refuse to take steps on behalf of the accused because of the lawyer's belief in the guilt
of the accused.").
58. 151 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 1998).
59. Id. at 627-28.
60. Id. at 626.
61. Id. at 631 (emphasis added).
62. The intent requirement for an obstruction of justice charge under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512 is subject to dispute as to what constitutes "corruptly." A majority of courts
employ the "improper purpose" analysis of "corruptly, requiring only that the
government show that the defendant acted with an improper purpose when engaged
in the conduct alleged to have obstructed justice but not requiring that the conduct
be wrongful in itself. See United States v. Arthur Andersen, 374 F.3d 271, 295 (5th
Cir. 2004) ("Congress knew that courts had uniformly defined 'corruptly' in 18
U.S.C. § 1503 as 'motivated by an improper purpose,' and it is logical to give the
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the client and to communicate regularly in the course of the
representation may in fact be the basis to demonstrate the intent to
obstruct justice.
Moreover, Cueto and Kloess show the precarious position of the
lawyer whose legal representation of the client brings the lawyer in
close proximity to the client's misconduct. 3 Although a lawyer may
believe that his conduct is innocent, a lawyer may run afoul of the
obstruction ofjustice statute while assisting the client. In United States
v. Kellington,6 Kellington, a civil lawyer, accommodated his client's
request to assist in disposing of certain property, which landed him in
the middle of an obstruction of justice indictment.65 After arrest, the
client, a fugitive from a federal drug conviction who had been
represented by Kellington in a civil case under an assumed name,
asked Kellington to remove certain items that were hidden in his
house.' Complying with this request, Kellington, who professed
ignorance of the nature of the materials and the extent of his client's
involvement in any misconduct, asked another person to destroy
items that appeared to be evidence of criminal conduct, including
cash and fake identity documents. 7 The trial court refused to permit
the jury to consider whether Kellington acted in a manner consistent
with the ethics rules, which would establish a defense under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1515(c).68 The Ninth Circuit held this decision in error because
word 'corruptly' in § 1512 the same meaning that it has in § 1503."); United States v.
Schotts, 145 F.3d 1289, 1300 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that the language used in
§ 1512 has been interpreted as meaning with an "improper purpose"); United States
v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 452 (2d Cir. 1996) (construing that the use of the term
"corrupt" in § 1512 requires that the government must prove that the defendant was
motivated by an "improper purpose"); United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 991
(1st Cir. 1987) (explaining that "§ 1503 criminalizes conduct which obstructs or
impedes the due administration ofjustice, provided such conduct is undertaken with
a corrupt or improper purpose"). The Third Circuit requires greater proof of intent
than just an attempt to hinder an investigation, stating that "an individual can
'persuade' another not to disclose information to a law enforcement official with the
intent of hindering an investigation without violating the statute, i.e., without doing
so 'corruptly.'" United States v. Farrell, 126 F.3d 484, 489 (3d Cir. 1997). The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Arthur Andersen case to review the meaning
of "corruptly." Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 823 (2005).
63. See Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
327, 386 (1998) (" [T] he very nature of this pursuit places lawyers at risk because they
deal more often than others with individuals who are themselves engaged in
wrongdoing, and, especially in the case of criminal defense lawyers, an aspect of the
risk is that the lawyer's conduct or intentions may be misperceived.").
64. 217 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000).
65. Id. at 1088-89.
66. Id. at 1088.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1099-1100.
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Kellington was unable to frame and give content to the core of his
defense-that Kellington was attempting (however imprudently in
hindsight) to provide his client with bona fide legal representation,
and that much of the conduct from which the government would
have the jury infer criminal intent can be explained by his ethical
69
obligations to [his client] ....
In Kellington, the lawyer professed ignorance of his client's
misconduct and testified that he would not have complied with the
request had he known more about the client's circumstances. 70 What
about the situation where a lawyer defends a client whom the lawyer
knows is guilty? Can the lawyer create a false impression of the
client's innocence to win an acquittal?
An ethics opinion issued by the State Bar of Michigan considered
whether a lawyer could call friends of the defendant as alibi witnesses
to testify that the defendant was with them at the time the victim
stated the robbery took place. 7' The defense lawyer learned from his
client that the victim's recollection of when the robbery took place
was later than the time when the crime actually occurred, due to the
fact that the defendant had rendered the victim unconscious before
72
robbing him. The alibi witnesses would testify truthfully that the
defendant was with them at the time the victim said the crime
occurred, thus creating a false impression with the court and the jury
that the defendant had not committed the crime when, in fact, he
had.73 The State Bar of Michigan opined that "[t]he situation with
the friends as alibi witnesses in the instant case does not involve
tampering with evidence. One cannot suborn the truth."
74
Therefore, the defense lawyer had a duty to call the witnesses because
the requirement of zealous representation of the client meant that
"where truthful testimony will be offered, it seems axiomatic that a
defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel in
presenting evidence, even though the defendant has made
inculpatory statements to his counsel.,
75
If a lawyer can create a false impression with the judge and jury, is
that a deception that could violate a criminal law? While the State
Bar of Michigan urged the lawyer to call the witnesses, in contrast,
69. Id.at 1101.
70. Id. at 1089.
71. Michigan Ethics Opinion CI-1164 (1987), available at http://www.michbar.
org/opinions/ethics/numbered_opinions/ci-1164.html.
7,2. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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the state of Minnesota has a statute that may prohibit such conduct. 76
The statute provides, "Every attorney or counselor at law who shall be
guilty of deceit or collusion... with intent to deceive the court or any
party... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. ,77 In State v. Casby,78 the
Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a lawyer for
violating the statute by not informing the court that her client gave
his brother's name when arrested for speeding and littering and then
when pleading guilty to the charges. 79 The court stated that "the
client was embarked on a course of continuing deceit. The sixth
amendment does not expect an attorney to assist a client in
furthering fraud on the court."0
If the defense lawyer's ethical obligation is to take advantage of any
weakness in the government's case, even if it requires the lawyer to
create a false impression with the jury about the defendant's
innocence, then the defense lawyer is indeed more than just a minor
hindrance in the criminal process, but a veritable obstruction to
obtaining a conviction. From the prosecutor's point of view, the
defense lawyer is something more than an embodiment of the
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel when that assistance
can obfuscate rather than illuminate the truth. But it is not an
obstruction of justice when the system depends on the defense
lawyer, who protects the client by attempting, within the confines of
the ethical rules, to obtain a result that may be contradictory to the
defendant's guilt. The defense lawyer is not a fate worse than death
for the prosecution but a necessary component of the criminal justice
system. The fact that some defense lawyers may cross the line into
improper conduct does not mean that lawyers as a rule obstruct
justice or otherwise act improperly.
II. TARGETING LAWYERS
The fact that lawyers are prosecuted for crimes is nothing new.
Lawyers have been prosecuted for embezzlement of client trust
funds,81 insider trading, and the use of confidential information for
76. 2004 MINN. LAws § 481.071.
77. Id.
78. 348 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1984).
79. Id. at 738-39.
80. Id. at 739. Casby received a public reprimand and two years supervised
probation for her conduct. See In re Application for the Discipline of Camelia J.
Casby, 355 N.W.2d 704, 705 (Minn. 1984).
81. See, e.g., In re Ford, 44 Cal. 3d 810 (1988) (disbarring an attorney due to his
admitted misappropriation of client funds held in trust); In re Lyons, 15 Cal. 3d 322(1975) (ordering that an attorney be disbarred as a result of misappropriation of
funds entrusted to the attorney).
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their own personal benefit. 2  These are clear abuses of lawyers'
positions of trust. In recent years, prosecutions of lawyers have
occurred for money laundering related to the payment of legal fees3
and for providing money generated by drug sales to arrested drug
cartel couriers to maintain their silence and to avoid the implication
of the cartel's leader.8 a In United States v. Gellene,85 the government
successfully prosecuted a prominent New York City bankruptcy lawyer
from a distinguished law firm for bankruptcy fraud. The government
prosecuted him because of his failure to fully disclose his
representation of other claimants in the bankruptcy proceeding, even
though the government never alleged that his legal work was affected
by the undisclosed conflicts.86 What is rather unnerving is that,
throughout these criminal investigations, prosecutors have used
lawyers as sources of information about the wrongdoing of their
clients.
87
82. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997) (upholding the
conviction of a lawyer who used confidential information from a client when
considering a hostile takeover to purchase securities of the target corporation);
United States v. ReBrook, 837 F. Supp. 162, 171 (S.D. W. Va. 1993) (finding that a
lawyer charged with insider trading and mail fraud for using confidential
information from a client to purchase shares in companies owed a duty to the public
and to his employer not to improperly use such information), rev'd, 58 F.3d 961 (4th
Cir. 1995); SEC v. Singer, 786 F. Supp. 1158, 1168-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (hearing the
SEC's argument that a lawyer traded securities of a company based upon information
received from a corporate director about a possible leveraged buy-out).
83. See United States v. Tarkoff, 242 F.3d 991 (lth Cir. 2001) (convicting
defense lawyers for money laundering in a case involving transfers of funds from a
client's United States account, comprised of proceeds from Medicare fraud, through
a financial institution in Curacao to accounts in Israel).
84. See United States v. Abbell, 271 F.3d 1286, 1297 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he
evidence supported a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that, to the extent
Rodriguez-Orejuela had other business interests, Abbell knew that those business
interests were so intertwined with Rodriguez-Orejuela's narcotics trafficking that
money paid by Rodriguez-Orejuela came, at a minimum, from commingled funds.").
85. 182 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 1999).
86. Id. at 588 ("We have no doubt that a misstatement in a Rule 2014
[disclosure] statement by an attorney about other affiliations constitutes a material
misstatement.... This requirement goes to the heart of the integrity of the
administration of the bankruptcy estate.").
87. See, e.g., United States v. White, 970 F.2d 328 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing the
government's obtainment of documents from a lawyer who had been convicted of
bankruptcy fraud and who decided to cooperate with a government investigation by
providing information about another client investigated in a separate bankruptcy
fraud); United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1987) (affirming the
admission of evidence gained by the use of a listening device by a lawyer who was a
target of a corruption investigation and who agreed to wear a listening device in
meetings with his client regarding possible drug transactions); cf United States v.
Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313 (2d Cir. 1994) (remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing
concerning whether the theft of documents from a lawyer's office used to convict
that lawyer for aiding bankruptcy fraud was under the direction of a government
agent).
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If lawyers are untrustworthy when they represent clients in criminal
investigations, then does it follow that they engage in criminal
conduct, constituting assistance in criminal schemes, when they
provide legal advice in everyday business transactions? Lawyers are
much more involved in advising clients about how to conduct their
business than ever before due to the pervasiveness of the regulation
of economic activity. When the lawyer moves from the courtroom to
the boardroom, the possibility of a lawyer becoming enmeshed in
questionable conduct increases substantially.
Many prosecutions of lawyers stem from their conduct in a
personal capacity or from their dealings with a court. In recent years,
however, there has been a substantial increase in the number of
criminal prosecutions of lawyers based on their legal advice to
businesses-far removed from the courtroom and the representation
of criminal defendants. As the government targets lawyers for how
they practice their profession, the question arises as to whether the
government views legal advice as another form of criminality in much
the same way that a conspiratorial agreement is subject to
prosecution.
The First Circuit's decision in United States v. Cintol89 highlights the
view that legal representation is simply another form of potential
misconduct. In Cintolo, the defendant-lawyer represented a witness in
a grand jury investigation of racketeering while he acted at the
direction of the criminal organization leader, who used Cintolo to
ensure that the witnesses did not testify.9° Cintolo counseled his
"client" to assert the Fifth Amendment and, when granted immunity,
to refuse to testify and to suffer a contempt charge. 9' Unknown to the
participants in the scheme, the government taped conversations
regarding Cintolo's representation, which made it clear that Cintolo
was not working in his client's best interest.
92
88. See Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and Their
Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 507, 525 (1994) ("Today, corporations depend more than
ever on lawyers to advise management and to lobby government concerning
regulation. Just as the creation of railroads and a banking system in the nineteenth
century was a legal as well as a business enterprise, legal risks in many of today's
highly regulated industries like banking, insurance, airlines, and waste management
have become business risks. Even apart from industry-specific regulation, regulation
of almost every aspect of economic life such as the environment, health and safety,
employment, and securities ensures that legal and business components of corporate
decisions are often intertwined.").
89. 818 F.2d 980 (1st Cir. 1987).
90. Id. at 984.
91. Id. at 984-87.
92. Id. at 984-88.
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Cintolo was convicted of conspiracy to obstruct justice. 93 On
appeal, he argued that he did not have the requisite "corrupt" intent
because the legal advice was not itself criminal.94 He also argued that
the jury should be instructed that a legitimate explanation by a lawyer
for his conduct in advising a client cannot obstructjustice.95 The First
Circuit rejected the arguments because "the acceptance of a retainer
by a lawyer in a criminal case cannot become functionally equivalent
to the lawyer's acceptance of a roving commission to flout the
criminal law with impunity. "9
While the court was correct that a lawyer could obstruct justice by
advising a client, Cintolo denigrated the nature of legal advice as
being different from other types of criminal conduct. The court
noted that giving a person a ride to the airport or buying a chisel
from a hardware store is not illegal unless it is a part of a larger
scheme to engage in misconduct, thereby converting legal acts into
illegal conduct.97 According to the First Circuit, legal advice is just
the same: "In the most fundamental sense, the 'advice' given by
Cintolo in the manipulation of his own client was a commodity no
different than the chisel or the free ride. It was legal to traffic in the
wares, but illegal corruptly to put them to felonious use." 8
However, legal advice is not a "ware" fetched off a shelf or a
fungible commodity available for the taking by paying the going rate.
The First Circuit misapprehended the nature of legal advice, which is
designed to assist a client to adhere to the law. Unlike the chisel or
free ride, legal advice involves the very possibility that the conduct at
issue will be illegal; otherwise, there would be no need to consult a
lawyer. When legal advice is provided to a client accused of a crime,
the role of the criminal defense lawyer is, at least in part, to frustrate
the system to ensure that only the guilty are convicted of a crime.
The lawyer may ethically obstruct the criminal justice system by
seeking an acquittal of a client, even a guilty one. In a business
setting, the lines are less clear because the legal advice is prospective
and ostensibly designed to avoid a violation rather than how to deal
with the consequences of one.
The conviction of Cintolo is certainly justifiable because lawyers
can cross the line from giving proper legal advice to misusing the
93. Id. at 992, 1005.
94. Id. at 990.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 993.
98. Id.
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tools of the criminal justice system to defeat its very purpose.' Under
the obstruction ofjustice statute, it is doubtful Cintolo provided bona
fide, legal representation services when he sought to shield one
person's criminality by manipulating his client. To call his conduct
ethical would be an absurdity. Yet, the view that legal advice is simply
a commodity that can be misused as easily as any other physical
device to commit a crime denigrates the importance of the lawyer in
the criminal justice system. If legal advice is merely another tool to
be misused, then lawyers are as guilty as any other person when they
defend clients by seeking to avoid their conviction.
If legal advice is essentially fungible, then targeting lawyers for
prosecution is a short step to take in expanding the scope of the
criminal law. Under this view, the presence of the lawyer is another
sign of criminality, and so, prosecutors can regard the lawyer as
criminally liable for giving legal advice that does not prevent others
from engaging in misconduct. It is this gatekeeper role of lawyers
advising businesses that makes legal advice particularly vulnerable to
a charge of assisting a client's fraud because the lawyer's role may be
so close to the misconduct that prosecutors consider them facilitators
of the crime. For example, in United States v. Anderson,'00 the
government brought a large-scale Medicare fraud indictment that
included two lawyers in addition to the doctors and hospital
administrators charged with an array of fraud and conspiracy
offenses.""' The lawyers represented several hospitals in trying to
create a legal means of compensating two doctors who referred a
large number of patients from nursing homes to the hospitals.02 The
government alleged that the lawyers, together with the other
defendants whose activities were more directly involved in the
misconduct, sought to erect a system to provide kickbacks to the
doctors by disguising illegal referral fees as consulting
arrangements.13
Throughout the negotiation process, the lawyers sought to
effectuate a business arrangement between the hospitals and the
doctors in a legal manner while operating in an area whose rules are
99. See United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 632 (7th Cir. 1998) (reasoning that
the adversarial system, and its goal of seeking justice, would be undermined if lawyers
were not reprimanded for criminal and manipulative conduct).
100. 85 F. Supp. 2d 1047 (D. Kan. 1999), rev'd by United States v. McClatchey, 217
F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 2000).
101. Id. at 1051.
102. Id. at 1055-56.
103. Id.
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arcane and subject to frequent, and often confusing, changes. 0 4 In
dismissing the charges against the lawyers, the trial judge stated:
It is undisputed from the evidence that all the lawyers who dealt
with or reviewed these transactions... held good faith beliefs that
it was possible to facilitate some business relationship between the
hospitals and [the doctors] .... [T]he reversals of field by the OIG
[Office of Inspector General, United States Department of Health
and Human Services] concerning its own interpretation, the
checkered history of the Hanlester [Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390
(9th Cir. 1995)] case and the reservation by Congress of a safe
harbor provision in the act (the promulgation of regulations
concerning which were delayed for a considerable time) all invite
lawyers to attempt to devise legal ways for parties to have a
relationship which has as a component hoped-for and anticipated
referrals ....
There were no decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court or from the
Eighth or Tenth Circuits, where the activities in question were
going on, to guide them. What the evidence unassailably
demonstrated is that [the lawyers] steadfastly maintained to their
clients that if fair market value were paid for the doctors' practice
or for legitimate consulting services, the relationship passed legal
scrutiny. Nothing in the evidence or the law suggests otherwise.
The lawyers prosecuted in Anderson were trying to craft a legal
solution for their client to achieve a legitimate business purpose. The
fact that they were in an area heavily regulated by the government,
and that they provided advice regarding conduct that, if done
improperly, could have resulted in criminal prosecution, put the
lawyers at risk of being labeled as co-conspirators and participants in
a scheme to defraud-even though their legal work sought to avoid
such an appellation.
One of the usual accouterments of fraud is that there is an illegal
benefit derived from the misstatements or omissions used to deceive
the victims and that the benefit usually comes from the victim,
although not always. 10 6 When the lawyer's services are part of the
scheme, a special payment or benefit to the lawyer will be a hallmark
of the lawyer's participation in the misconduct, in addition to the
provided legal advice, whatever its considered worth. 107 The mail
104. Id. at 1060.
105. Id. at 1064-65.
106. Stephen Fraidin & Laura B. Mutterperl, Advice for Lawyers: Navigating the New
Realm of Federal Regulation of Legal Ethics, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 609, 615 (2003) (noting
that lawyers have been prosecuted for their involvement in fraudulent schemes,
insider trading, and market manipulation).
107. See Sylvia E. Stevens, A Fine Line: When Does Giving Legal Advice Become Assisting
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fraud statute,' however, has been applied to ethical breaches that
deprive a client of the lawyer's undivided loyalty in representation,
even where a lawyer does not gain any special benefit.
In United States v. Bronston,°9 the government charged a lawyer, who
was also a state senator, with mail fraud for secretly representing a
company seeking a city bus shelter contract when his firm already
represented a competitor seeking the same contract." ° The lawyer's
breach of the duty of loyalty owed to his firm's client constituted
fraud."' The Second Circuit found itself "faced with a straight-
forward economic fraud in which the object of the scheme was not
merely to deprive the victims of a law firm's undivided loyalty, for
which they paid $52,000, but to deprive [the client] and its minority
investors of the [client's] franchise." 2  In criticizing the decision,
Professor John Coffee argued that,
[H]owever rare the Bronston facts may seem, conflicts of interest
are as inevitable as death and taxes. Current law appears to be
approaching the point of criminalizing a conflict of interest
whenever the fiduciary knowingly fails to disclose its existence and
thereby deprives his beneficiary of his "honest and faithful
services.""
Bronston's actions likely deprived the firm's client of the right of
honest services, at least to the extent that it could count on the
a Client with Fraud ?, 63 OR. ST. B. BuLL. 29, 30-32 (listing and describing a number of
cases in which lawyers were found to have assisted their clients in the perpetration of
a fraud).
108. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2002).
109. 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981).
110. Id. at 922-26.
111. Id. at 922.
112. (d. at 929-30.
113. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing Stoy of the
"Evolution" of a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 13 (1983). In United States v.
Gellene, 182 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 1999), a bankruptcy lawyer's failure to disclose to the
court that he had represented other parties with claims against the bankrupt
company resulted in a conviction for bankruptcy fraud. Like Bronston, there was no
evidence of an economic harm to the client, but unlike Bronston, the lawyer misled
the court in connection with being appointed as counsel for the bankrupt company.
Id. at 587-88. While both cases involved a conflict of interest, the real lesson of
Gelene is that lawyers who actively mislead a court will be convicted, regardless of
whether there is any direct economic harm.
In United States v. Drury, 687 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1982), the Fifth Circuit upheld a
lawyer's conviction of mail fraud for not disclosing to his clients that he received a
fifteen percent kickback of the medical fees from a physician to whom the lawyer
referred his personal injury clients. The court found that the lawyer breached his
fiduciary duty to his clients by concealing the financial arrangements with the
hysician "and consequently and surreptitiously pocket[ing] a larger fee than that he
ad agreed on with the client." Id. at 65. Unlike Bronston, the lawyer used his clients
to enrich himself, not necessarily at their expense, but certainly without regard to
their interest in paying the lowest fee possible for legal representation.
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lawyers in the firm to refrain from helping a competitor. Now, this
type of intangible harm-the deprivation to the right of honest
services-comes specifically within the scope of the mail fraud statute:
a lawyer's ethical violation could be a basis for bringing criminal
charges, although the client must suffer some harm from the breach
of duty. 14 Because lawyers act as fiduciaries for their clients, the
extent to which a lawyer acts unethically by not providing loyal service
to a client could be seen as a scheme to defraud, at least when there
is some improper benefit to the lawyer or economic loss to the client
from the ethical breach.
1 5
If the ethics rules can form the basis of a criminal prosecution,
then the next step may be the pursuit of lawyers for their
representation of clients that, while not unethical, fails to prevent
misconduct. A recent indictment of a lawyer for his representation of
a corporate client by the Department of Justice may indicate this
expansion of the scope of potential criminal liability for lawyers. In
United States v. Munson,"6 the government indicted the executives of
an energy trading subsidiary of a utility company along with Munson,
the corporation's outside counsel, for securities and mail fraud for
submitting false financial statements."' The indictment alleged that
Munson helped the executives "pump up" the company's earnings by
"stretching fiscal recognition of a $1.25 million settlement" over two
fiscal years, thereby lowering the company's expenses and increasing
its earnings. 8 Munson represented the subsidiary in the settlement,
but the indictment does not discuss how his legal representation
related to the fraudulent accounting of the settlement. 9 Moreover,
114. See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2002) ("For the purposes of this chapter, the term
,scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of
the intangible right of honest services.").
115. See Ellsworth A. Van Graafeiland, The Proposed Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and the Mail Fraud Statute, 48 BROOK. L. REv. 653, 659 (1982) ("If the local
leader of a political party, who is not a public officeholder, can be convicted of mail
fraud for depriving citizens of their right to honest government, no major
conceptual leap is required to argue that a lawyer who deprives the public of its right
to the honest administration ofjustice should also be held liable. If the provisions of
the proposed Model Rules do tilt toward a concern for society at large, an issue that
will not be debated here, intentional violations of rules such as Rule 3.3 may well
support future charges of mail fraud.").
116. No. 03 CR 1153, 03 CR 1154, 2004 WL 1672880 (N.D. Ill.July 28, 2004).
117. See id. at *1 (outlining Munson's manipulation of the company's earnings
statements to make it appear more profitable than it truly was by violating accepted
accounting principles when structuring the payment of a $1.25 million dollar
settlement to another utility company).
118. Id.
119. See United States v. Stoffer, No. 03CRl153, 2003 WL 23145605 (N.D. Ill. Dec.
10, 2003) (focusing on how Munson worked with executives in an attempt to make
the company appear more profitable through accounting principles as opposed to
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while the executives received bonuses based on meeting certain
financial goals, the indictment alleges only that Munson "sought to
please a client.., from whom he hoped to obtain additional legal
business and eventual employment," including being appointed as
general counsel for the subsidiary.""
The case is still in the pre-trial phase, and so, the government has
not yet brought forth its proof. The indictment, however, contains
no allegation that Munson's legal advice to the corporate client was
relevant to the accounting treatment of the expense, nor does it
contain an allegation that he breached any fiduciary obligation to the
client.12 Moreover, his gain from the fraudulent scheme, unlike the
monetary benefits reaped by the company's executives, consists of the
vague "hope [] to obtain additional legal business" and perhaps being
hired as the client's in-house counsel.122 It is axiomatic that lawyers
seek to continue their representation of clients, either in the current
matter or in future legal issues. Indeed, one of the benefits of
retaining a lawyer on a long-term basis is the cost-savings for clients
who then have a lawyer familiar with their legal needs and who
establishes a good working relationship with the officers and
managers of the company interacting with the lawyer on a regular
basis.
There is nothing wrong with "hoping" for future legal business, as
long as the lawyer provides competent representation and maintains
the requisite independence from the client. Tellingly, the
indictment of Munson does not make any reference to his shaping
legal advice to curry favor with the client or his using information
from the representation to favor his own position to the detriment of
the client, which would be a breach of his ethical duties. 123 Unlike
Bronston, in which the lawyer's ethical breach can be viewed as having
harmed the client's interest by helping a competitor, in this case, the
government appears to have indicted the lawyer because he did not
prevent the wrongdoing from occurring. In this sense, the lawyer's
failure to undertake a gatekeeper role, rather than any specific
problem with the legal advice offered to the client, appears to be the
criminal conduct. It may be that Munson conspired with the other
executives to mislead the parent corporation or altered documents to
examining the impact Munson's legal advice had on the company).
120. Id. at 1If, 3.
121. See generally Stoffer, 2003 WL 23145605.
122. Id. at 1.f, 3.
123. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDUcT R. 1.8(b) (2002) ("A lawyer shall not use
information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client
unless the client gives informed consent.. ").
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conceal the fraudulent accounting, but the indictment contains no
indication that such events occurred. Instead, it appears that the
lawyer was not charged for misconduct in his role as counsel to the
company, but rather, was charged with being at the scene of the
crime and not doing anything to stop it, apparently with the "hope"
of gaining future business.
III. TARGETING LEGAL ADVICE
Lawyers can be held accountable for the legal advice that they
provide to clients in a number of ways. Malpractice suits provide
clients with a means of redress when the lawyer was negligent in the
representation. Similarly, even if the lawyer was not negligent, a
breach of fiduciary duty can result in an award of damages or a
return of the legal fees. Each state maintains an extensive
disciplinary apparatus for reviewing complaints against lawyers and
can impose sanctions against lawyers ranging from private
admonitions to suspensions and even disbarment for serious
misconduct. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act,"" adopted in 2002 in the wake
of spectacular corporate failures involving large corporations like
Enron and Worldcom, empowered the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") to impose an ethical obligation on lawyers of
publicly-traded corporations to report wrongdoing within the
corporation to senior management and to the board of directors.12 5
Judges have not hesitated to hold lawyers in contempt for misconduct
during litigation, and lawyers are not shy about complaining about
the conduct of opposing counsel by seeking disqualification.
While the effectiveness of these means to redress wrongdoing by
lawyers is open to question, the profession does not operate without
124. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C.).
125. See 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. 2004). Section 7245 provides:
Not later than 180 days afterJuly 30, 2002, the Commission shall issue rules,
in the public interest and for the protection of investors, setting forth
minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and
practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers,
including a rule-
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of
securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company
or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer
of the company (or the equivalent thereof); and
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the evidence
(adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or sanctions with
respect to the violation), requiring the attorney to report the evidence to the
audit committee of the board of directors of the issuer or to another
committee of the board of directors comprised solely of directors not
employed directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of directors.
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oversight by both administrative bodies and the judiciary. As
prosecutors use the criminal law with greater frequency to pursue
charges against lawyers for conduct that would have been the subject
of a disciplinary or malpractice action in an earlier time, the issue
becomes one of the appropriateness of the regulation of lawyers
through the criminal process. As Professor Bruce Green notes, "The
criminal law's regulatory role is most interesting, and potentially
troubling, in situations where the criminal law points lawyers in one
direction but other professional norms, such as those embodied in
the lawyer codes, appear to point lawyers in the opposite direction."
126
The issue now has expanded into whether legal advice has become
an obstruction to criminal investigations and prosecutions such that
the mere presence of a lawyer is indicia of guilt and a sign that the
person is not cooperating with the government. The SEC's Director
of Enforcement, Stephen Cutler, stated in a speech:
One area of particular focus for us is the role of lawyers in internal
investigations of their clients or companies. We are concerned
that, in some instances, lawyers may have conducted investigations
in such a manner as to help hide ongoing fraud, or may have taken
actions to actively obstruct such investigations.1
2
1
A lawyer who orders the destruction of documents or removal of
electronic files from a server to keep them from the government
would clearly be guilty of obstruction of justice. Now, however,
internal investigations are standard whenever there is even a hint of
impropriety at a corporation. In such a situation, the lawyer's advice
to the company and its employees could be to not respond to the
government's request for interviews and to assert the Fifth
Amendment privilege until corporate counsel completes an
investigation. Would that directive obstruct an investigation?
While the destruction of documents is surely criminal, Mr. Cutler's
statement may include more than what is prohibited already by
criminal law because one would certainly hope that the SEC is
vigilant regarding such flagrant misconduct. The question is whether
legal advice, given to a corporation to not cooperate with the
government and to resist a subpoena for records, or advice given to
individual employees that they can assert their Fifth Amendment
rights would be "obstruction" in the eyes of the SEC. There is
126. Green, supra note 63, at 391-92.
127. Stephen M. Cutler, The Themes of Sarbanes-Oxley as Reflected in the
Commission's Enforcement Program, Speech at the UCLA School of Law (Sept. 20,
2004), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch092004smc.htm (on file with the
American University Law Review).
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nothing illegal about this advice, but once again, the lawyer's
involvement may be viewed as inherently suspect, at least until the
company agrees to cooperate fully. If there is a suspicion that lawyers
act to obstruct justice without violating the ethical rules-indeed,
when acting ethically-then the results of an internal investigation
will not be trustworthy because it was tainted by a lawyer seeking to
protect the corporate client who conducted the review.
The Thompson Memorandum takes that suspicion of lawyers to a
higher level by making waivers of the attorney-client privilege and the
work product protection a strong indicia of cooperation. 12 8 It has the
following as a general principle:
In determining whether to charge a corporation, that corporation's
timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness
to cooperate with the government's investigation may be relevant
factors. In gauging the extent of the corporation's cooperation,
the prosecutor may consider the corporation's willingness to
identify the culprits within the corporation, including senior
executives; to make witnesses available; to disclose the complete
results of its internal investigation; and to waive attorney-client and
work product protection."'
The DOJ explains that waivers assist its investigations because they
"permit the government to obtain statements of possible witnesses,
subjects, and targets, without having to negotiate individual
cooperation or immunity agreements." 130  Those are the very
agreements that lawyers for individuals would extract from the
government as the price for the cooperation of an officer or
employee. By having the corporation conduct at least the first phase
of the investigation, the government can obtain statements that a
lawyer would otherwise advise a client not to make without the
protection of an immunity agreement or plea bargain.
Some have criticized the "waiver" as hardly voluntary because of the
coercive effect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines'31 and the ease
128. See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 14, at VI.A.
129. Id.
130. Id. atVI.B.
131. See Lance Cole, Revoking Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement's Multi-Front
Assault on the Attorney-Client Privilege (and Why It Is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REV. 469, 537-
38 (2002) (claiming that the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines pressure companies
to cooperate with the government to receive a lower culpability score); see also U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. § 8C2.5(g) (2003) (outlining the mitigating
effect of a corporation's self-reporting, cooperation, and acceptance of
responsibility). But see Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective Cooperation by Business
Organizations and the Impact of Privilege Waivers, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587, 608
(2004) (noting that Application Note 12 to § 8C2.5 was recently amended to clarify
that a waiver is not always a prerequisite to a lower culpability score).
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with which a corporation can be proven guilty under the principle of
respondeat superior.132 A Comment to the Thompson Memorandum
states that the DOJ "does not, however, consider waiver of a
corporation's attorney-client and work product protection an
absolute reqrement." However, this provides cold comfort to
corporate counsel assessing whether to waive the protections afforded
to lawyers conducting internal investigations, because the
determination of whether a corporation has sufficiently cooperated is
completely within the DOJ's discretion.'-" Moreover, corporate
counsel have questioned whether they will receive complete
cooperation from employees if it is known that what is said or
provided in the internal investigation will be turned over to the
government and, in all likelihood, to private litigants.
The government simply is not lazy by seeking the waiver to obtain
the complete results of the internal investigation. It is, instead,
symptomatic of the DOJ's mistrust of lawyers, who can use the shield
of the attorney-client privilege and the work product protection to
safeguard the content of their internal investigation and, potentially,
make it more difficult for the government to fully investigate
corporate misconduct. If lawyers tell their clients not to cooperate
with the government without some protection-either a grant of
immunity or a plea agreement-then perhaps the corporation will
obtain the statements that will spare the government from having to
pay the price for such cooperation. However, it is unlikely that the
government will accept the conclusions of an internal investigation
uncritically or forego its own investigation simply because the
corporation's lawyers have already conducted one. Nonetheless, the
waiver gives prosecutors some assurance that they have not missed
anything protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work
product protection. It allows them to consider charges without
having to make deals with officers or employees to obtain
information.
This fear of legal advice is further shown by a Comment to the
Thompson Memorandum where the DOJ identifies conduct that can
132. See Cole, supra note 131, at 543 (arguing that allowing prosecutors to
consider a corporation's willingness to waive the attorney-client privilege and the
work product protection "go [es] quite far toward effectively forcing a corporation to
waive privilege protections if it hopes to obtain favorable charging treatment at the
hands of DOJ prosecutors").
133. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 14, atVI.B.
134. But see Buchanan, supra note 131, at 597 ("[C]laims that the sanctity of the
attorney-client privilege is being undermined by the Department's assessment of
cooperation by organizational defendants are greatly overstated. In any case, the
decision to waive the privilege must be made by the corporation.").
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demonstrate a lack of cooperation from an organization that
"appears to be protecting its culpable employees and agents:"
[A] corporation's promise of support to culpable employees and
agents, either through the advancing of attorneys fees, through
retaining the employees without sanction for their misconduct, or
through providing information to the employees about the
government's investigation pursuant to a joint defense agreement,
may be considered by the prosecutor in weighing the extent and
value of a corporation's cooperation.13
5
The Comment contains a footnote acknowledging that some states
require the payment of attorney's fees and that "a corporation's
compliance with governing law should not be considered a failure to
cooperate."1 6 What the footnote does not address is whether a
contractual obligation to provide attorney's fees that is authorized,
but not compelled, by a state's corporate law, would be considered
inappropriate support.
1 3 7
Ethics rules require that a lawyer may not represent multiple
clients when a potential conflict of interest between their positions
exists, or if the lawyer's representation of one client would limit the
representation of a second. 138 An investigation of a corporation and
its officers and employees will almost certainly require that each
individual be represented by separate counsel, especially if the
government plans to seek the cooperation of one or more of the
investigative targets to testify against the others. Payment of the
attorney's fees of an officer or employee during an investigation may
135. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 14, atVI.B.
136. Id. atVI.B n.4.
137. For example, Delaware law allows a corporation to enter into agreements for
the payment of expenses beyond what is required by its law. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 145(f) (2001). Another provision permits a corporation to advance the attorney's
fees of an officer or director in a criminal investigation or prosecution "upon receipt
of an undertaking by or on behalf of such director or officer to repay such amount if
it shall ultimately be determined that such person is not entitled" to receive
attorney's fees from the company. Id. § 145(e). Would a contract or by-law provision
requiring the advancement of attorney's fees to an officer show that the corporation
is not cooperating with the government?
138. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.7(b) (2002). It provides:
Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest .. , a
lawyer may represent a client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide
competent and diligent representation to each affected client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client
against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or
other proceeding before a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
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well be in the corporation's best interest because its own culpability
will be based on the conduct of the officers. The presence of the
lawyers will, however, frustrate the government's investigation, which
the Thompson Memorandum views as a basis for seeking to have the
corporation waive its privileges. 39
By discouraging corporations from paying for separate counsel, the
government uses the ethical prohibition on conflicts of interest to
obtain information from individuals that it might not otherwise be
able to get. Counsel for the corporation cannot give legal advice to
individual officers without running afoul of the conflict rules, and, if
paying for a separate lawyer will be a sign of non-cooperation, the
corporation is unlikely to suggest that the employee obtain his or her
own lawyer before cooperating in the investigation, lest it appear to
be shielding the employee. This puts corporate counsel in a
precarious position under the ethics rules if the employee thinks the
lawyer represents the individual, and the lawyer fails to correct that
misperception.'4°
If the government requires corporate counsel to ensure that
individuals cooperate with internal investigations as a condition to
finding that the corporation itself cooperated, then the Thompson
Memorandum seeks to take advantage of an individual's lack of
knowledge and willingness to help an employer. Proof of corporate
cooperation may be contingent on showing that no lawyers other
than the corporation's were present and that all privilege and work
product claims can be waived. This approach views lawyers, who are
not subject to the government's coercive power over the corporation,
as likely to frustrate investigations. Therefore, they must not be
present if the government wishes to accomplish its goal.
The premise of the DOJ's view that the payment of attorney's fees
signals a lack of cooperation is that the corporation may be shielding
a "culpable" employee.14 Apparently, providing a lawyer to a person
who is guilty seems to be sure indicia of an uncooperative
organization. The problem is that "culpable" is not defined
anywhere, and surely it cannot mean "guilty" because there has not
139. See generally Thompson Memorandum, supra note 14, at VI.A.
140. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 1.13(d) (2002) ("In dealing with an
organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other
constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows
or reasonably should know that the organization's interests are adverse to those of
the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing."); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2002) ("When a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the
unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer
shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.").
141. See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 14, at VI.B.
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been any adjudication of criminal liability at the point when the DOJ
considers whether to charge the corporation with a crime. The
Thompson Memorandum seems to include any person who the
government believes engaged in wrongdoing as "culpable," and
therefore, not worthy of receiving any benefit from the corporation,
regardless of the phase of the investigation.
An inquiry into possible corporate misconduct occurs before, not
after, charges are filed because it is not clear whether a crime
occurred. Any determination of culpability, therefore, must wait at
least until the government has probable cause that a person
committed an offense and files an indictment. Yet, the Thompson
Memorandum treats virtually any employee who might be involved in
misconduct as culpable well before the investigation is complete.
This turns the presumption of innocence on its head because a
corporation that does not immediately turn on a potentially culpable
employee has not cooperated and may suffer an indictment itself.
The government's suspicion of the corporation's cooperative spirit
is further heightened if there is a joint defense agreement.
Generally, courts have been supportive of these types of agreements
as a means to share information among those with a common interest
to facilitate their legal defense without risking the complete loss of
the attorney-client privilege.142 Yet, the Thompson Memorandum
views these agreements as a sign that the corporation is not
cooperative in the government's investigation. 43  The internal
investigation becomes much more difficult if conducted in an
atmosphere of distrust, yet the government seeks to take advantage of
the corporation's presumed authority over its employees to obtain
statements it might otherwise be unable to access.144
Ajoint defense agreement allows lawyers for individuals to monitor
the investigation and makes it easier to formulate a common defense,
thereby making the government's investigation more difficult. Like
the payment of attorney's fees, the joint defense agreement enhances
the ability of the lawyer to defend the client, and therefore, is
something the DOJ views with great suspicion.
142. See United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989) ("The joint
defense privilege, more properly identified as the 'common interest rule,'... has
been described as 'an extension of the attorney client privilege,' .... It serves to
protect the confidentiality of communications passing from one party to the attorney
for another party where ajoint defense effort or strategy has been decided upon and
undertaken by the parties and their respective counsel.").
143. See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 14, at VI.
144. See Finder, supra note 19, at 112 (remarking that a company facing an
internal investigation now considers it problematic for relationships among
employees, management, and the board of directors).
20051
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The rationale for the Thompson Memorandum is that "[t]oo often
business organizations, while purporting to cooperate with a
Department investigation, in fact take steps to impede the quick and
effective exposure of the complete scope of wrongdoing under
investigation.' 45 This presupposes, of course, that criminal conduct
has taken place and that the corporation and its employees are
responsible, so that the only issue for the government is to identify
the culprits and bring them to justice. Corporations certainly commit
crimes, but it is not always immediately apparent that criminal
conduct has taken place at the start of an investigation. Unlike
ordinary street crimes, such as theft or drug-dealing, which are
obviously criminal, economic crimes often involve business
transactions that are not inherently wrongful. 146  While everyone
assumes that Enron was rife with criminality, the actual causes of its
demise were not theft or embezzlement, but rather, involved the use
of sophisticated financial vehicles and transactions that are
147
recognized as perfectly legitimate in most circumstances.
If the assumption is that every investigation of organizational
misconduct will result in a criminal conviction, then the DOJ's
disdain for lawyers would be defensible. But it is not always the case
that the corporation and its officers are engaged in wrongdoing. In a
recent prosecution of two mid-level executives from the K-Mart
Corporation who were accused of securities fraud, the government
145. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 14, at Introduction.
146. See Green, supra note 13, at 510(
Not only does white collar crime present difficulties in assessing the means
by which it is committed, the harms it causes, and the victims it affects, but
there are also problems in determining exactly who (or what, in the case of
an entity) should be held responsible. Many of the offenses referred to
above are most likely to occur within the context of complex institutions,
such as large corporations, partnerships, and government agencies. In such
organizations, responsibility for decision making and implementation is
shared among boards of directors, shareholders, top and mid-level
managers, and ground-level employees. As a result, the blame we attribute
to an individual actor within the organization in which he works may be less
than the blame we attribute to an individual actor committing an equally
serious street crime on his own.
147. See Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death of "May", 48
V1LL. L. REV. 1245, 1245-46 (2003) ("Enron is largely a story about derivatives-
financial instruments such as options, futures, and other contracts whose value is
linked to some underlying financial instrument or index. A close analysis of the facts
shows that the most prominent SPE [Special Purpose Entity] transactions were
largely irrelevant to Enron's collapse, and that most of Enron's deals with SPEs were
arguably legal, even though disclosure of those deals did not comport with economic
reality. To the extent SPEs are relevant to understanding Enron, it is the derivatives
transactions between Enron and the SPEs-not the SPEs themselves-that matter.
Even more important were Enron's derivatives trades and transactions other than
those involving the SPEs.").
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dismissed the charges after its second witness contradicted her earlier
grand jury testimony about the receipt of documents that showed the
defendants had not tried to deceive the company about the
accounting for a transaction. 148 Similarly, the charges against the
individuals arising from the Salt Lake City Olympic bid scandal were
dismissed at the close of the government's case, and the district court
judge stated that the government's case had offended his sense of
justice. 149 Unlike the view of NYPD Blue, that "lawyering up" is only
done by guilty suspects to thwart an investigation, corporate officers
and employees do not necessarily act illegally in every instance, and
their reliance on lawyers is not designed simply to frustrate the
government's investigation of clear wrongdoing.
CONCLUSION
The world might be a better place without lawyers, although I
doubt it. We hear quite frequently the quotation from Shakespeare's
Henry VI (Part II)' 50-"The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers. " 15'
However, we are not quite sure how to react. Leave it to lawyers-
and legal academics-to argue whether that line was meant as a true
wish for a better world without lawyers or a compliment to lawyers
because of their ability to guard against despotism.- 2  However,
lawyers are recognized as important in the civil arena and
constitutionally required in many criminal cases. As Justice Stevens
noted in a dissenting opinion:
If the Government, in the guise of a paternalistic interest in
protecting the citizen from his own improvidence, can deny him
access to independent counsel of his choice, it can change the
character of our free society. Even though a dispute with the
sovereign may only involve property rights, .. . the citizen's right of
access to the independent, private bar is itself an aspect of liberty
that is of critical importance in our democracy.
53
148. See David Ashenfelter & Greta Guest, Charges Tossed in Kmart Crime Case,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 8, 2003, at Al.
149. See Mike Gorrell & Linda Fantin, Acquitted, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 6, 2003, at
Al (quoting the judge as stating: "In all my 40 years experience with the criminal
justice system ... I have never seen a criminal case brought to trial that was so devoid
of criminal intent or evil purpose.... This, in light of the evidence presented,
offends my sense ofjustice.").
150. WILuAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH, act 4, sc.
2.
151. Id.
152. For various commentators' interpretations of the Shakespeare quotation, see
Benjamin Barton, The Emperor of Ocean Park: The Quintessence of Legal Academia, 92
CAL. L. REV. 585, 600 n.46 (2004) (book review).
153. Waiters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 370-71 (1985)
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In the name of investigating corporate crime, the DOJ has given
expression to a mistrust of lawyers as little more than hindrances to
the protection of society from wrongdoing. We are told, in effect,
that lawyers cannot be trusted because their ethical rules permit them
to obstruct justice, and their advice to clients to assert their
constitutional rights makes it appreciably more difficult to investigate
and to prosecute economic crimes committed by corporations and
their officers and employees.
However, the DOJ's suspicion of lawyers and the targeting of legal
advice as something to be limited or eliminated if possible from
corporate crime investigations are steps toward viewing all such
allegations of misconduct as proven unless-and until-determined
otherwise. I submit that this approach takes the issue of
overcriminalization to a new level by making the provision of proper
legal advice an indicia of criminality and an instrumentality to be
removed from the hands of those subject to a criminal investigation
in much the same way an officer would take a weapon or contraband
from a suspect.
(Stevens,J., dissenting).
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